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AGAINST DICTIONARIES: USING ANALOGICAL REASONING
TO ACHIEVE A MORE RESTRAINED TEXTUALISM
Jason Weinstein*
This Note argues that new textualists should abandon dictionaries as a source for
legal interpretation. Textualists believe in restricting judges to the intent discerni-
ble from the words of a statute and contend that legislative history is unacceptable
as a source of this intention. Both of these sentiments lead textualists to dictionar-
ies as the intuitively correct solution for ambiguities in a text. The author argues,
howeve, that dictionaries by their very nature cannot help discern between reason-
able definitions at the margins of meaning. The use of dictionaries in these
situations allows for a sham formalism, unrestrictive in result and unrevealing of
a judge's extra-legal considerations.
As a replacement for dictionaries, this Note suggests a classic method of legal
thought: analogical reasoning. The author proposes that a judge faced with an
ambiguous yet basic term should develop analogous phrases for the term's possible
usages. In reasoning among these analogies a judge would develop and articulate
principles, revealing her legal and extra-legal considerations. The very transpar-
ency of the process would result in a restrictiveness based on the judge's need to
meet her peer's process values.
"I have to have a constitutional argument? Can't I just use common
sense and reason?"
-Justice Antonin Scalia'
The "new textualism," as it is frequently called,2 is a method of
statutory interpretation whereby a judge reads a statute and asks
how the ordinary reader would interpret the text.3 New textualists
argue that the words of the statute, not the lawmaker's intentions,
* A.B. 2001, Cornell University; J.D. expected 2006, University of Michigan. The au-
thor would like to thank James Boyd White for his thoughtful comments and Nina
Mendelson for her help throughout the life of this project.
1. Justice Antonin Scalia, Question and Answer Session at the University of Michigan
Law School (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
The response was given to a question concerning the constitutional argument of Scalia's
opinion granting a stay of vote counting in Bush v. Gore, specifically his view that further
recounts would cause the public to question the efficacy of the process. See Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia,J., concurring).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (trac-
ing and critiquingJustice Scalia's "new textualism" as a response to what Scalia considers the
Court's over-reliance on legislative history).
3. Id. at 623.
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should be dispositive. The most notable new textualist,4 Justice An-
tonin Scalia, says, "[ijt is simply incompatible with democratic
government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather
than by what the lawgiver promulgated."5 Considering the use of
legislative history to be a cryptic form of interpretation, Scalia lik-
ens it to Emperor Nero posting edicts so high on the pillars that
citizens could not read them.6
Instead new textualists believe that in interpreting the language
of laws, the ordinary meaning of a word must be understood within
the context of the surrounding words and laws.' New textualism is
far more complex than simply a "plain meaning" rule in this re-
spect because it does not limit interpretation to the four corners of
the document. 8 New textualists believe contextual sources do not
extend-as intentionalists believe-to items such as legislative his-
tory or committee reports.9 While intentionalists emphasize the
importance of discerning a legislative intent, textualists believe this
intent exists not in floor statements and committee reports, but
rather in a "sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reason-
able person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpusjuris."'° In short, a new textu-
alist judge uses what this Note will call a "contextual toolbox"
which includes "dictionaries and grammar books, the whole stat-
ute, analogous provisions in other statutes, canons of construction,
and the common sense God gave us."" The last tool, common
sense, is important because it shows flexibility in new textualism to
depart, in some real sense, from citable sources.
This Note does not criticize this contextual toolbox as a whole,
nor does it weigh the restrictions of textualism versus intentional-
ism." Rather, this Note assumes the validity of "new textualism" as a
judicially restraining method of interpretation, along with the inva-
4. Id.
5. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE Lkw
17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
6. Id.
7. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 244-45 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
8. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 621 ("[T]he meaning of a text critically depends
upon its surrounding context.").
9. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Cherron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 356 n.22 (1994).
10. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17.
11. ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 669.
12. For the purposes of this paper, I will accept Justice Scalia's argument that legisla-
tive history is little more than an excuse for judicial lawmaking while strict adherence limits
a judge's power. See Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2177, 2196 (2003).
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lidity of legislative history as a contextual source. It argues only that
the elimination of dictionaries as a contextual resource would add
to the judicially restrictive goals of the textualist doctrine. A new
textualism definition need only be upheld on the context of the
phrase in question, the intention of the statute, the appropriate
canons of construction, the corpus juris and "the common sense
God gave us." By turning to the dictionary, judges either blunt
their linguistic intuitions about correct usage or mask their biases
through formalist semantics, primarily because they already know
the meaning or meanings of the words they look up.
A completely unbiased judiciary is a chimera at best, if even de-
sirable. However, transparency of reasoning forces "activist" judges
to truly justify subjective decisions to their peers and community. A
codification of word definitions-the dictionary-would seem to
be the most restrictive way to solve word ambiguities in statutory
interpretations. However, in hard cases codification can be the
least restrictive method of all because it promotes formalism.
13
While formalism is not devastating to an argument, it often takes
the place of difficult reasoning. In many of the cases to follow, had
the courts in question eliminated dictionary analysis and used the
already known skill of analogical reasoning to find ordinary usage,
they may have arrived at more transparent and less impeachable
judgments.
Part I shows the ways in which judges use dictionaries to inter-
pret statutes, the increasing frequency with which judges are
turning to such methods, and concludes with a short defense of
the practice. Part II then summarizes the various criticisms of the
Dictionary Method. Most importantly, the Dictionary Method en-
courages an acontextual interpretation of a word, thereby blunting
linguistic intuitions about correct usage while masking biases. Part
III demonstrates, through a Wittgenstein-esque word game, a tech-
nique of defining common words relying solely on context and
purpose within a framework of analogical reasoning. Part III then
summarizes recent theories on analogical reasoning. Using the
commonalities among these theories and the linguistic philosophy
of Part II, Part III then suggests a new method of defining ambigu-
ous terms. Having suggested a new method that yields no citable
sources, Part IV argues that analogical reasoning is the foremost
process of decision making within a judge's "interpretive
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning; 106 HARv. L. REv. 741,
756 (1993).
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community."14 Further, within the new textualist community,
"common sense" is an acceptable internal source. Part IV con-
cludes that, standing alone, constraints of process and source
should be sufficiently restraining on judges and acceptable within
the legal community.
I.JUDICIAL USE OF DICTIONARIES
A. Frequency of Use
The Supreme Court rarely used the dictionary prior to the
1860's." From the 1860's to 1900 the dictionary was used in forty-
two opinions to define fifty-eight words.' 6 From 1900 until 1970 the
dictionary was used in 100 opinions to define 141 terms.17 In the
1970's dictionary use increased to forty opinions defining fifty
terms. 8 The 1980's saw an even more marked jump to 100 opin-
ions, defining 125 terms.'9 From 1990 to 1998 the court cited the
dictionary almost 180 times to define more than 220 terms.2 ' As
evidence of this pattern of ever-increasing use, the court has used
the dictionary at least 146 times from 1994 to 2002.21 The 1990's
actually generated about half of all the opinions in the Court's his-
tory in which dictionaries were used. In other words, while the
dictionary has long been a tool of judicial interpretation for the
Supreme Court, its rise in usage from the 1970's onward has been
absolutely dramatic. 2
14. See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 745 (1982).
15. Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 227, 254 (1999). The diction-
ary was used by the Supreme Court three times prior to 1864. Id. at 248.
16. Id. at 248-49.
17. Id. at 249-52.
18. Id. at 252.
19. Id at 253-54. See Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, AMERICAN SPEECH,
Spring 1993, at 50. From 1986 to 1991 the Court used a dictionary in ninety cases or 11
percent of the 804 total cases before the court during that period. Id. at 51. Scalia was the
leader with eighteen opinions using the dictionary. Id.
20. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 253-54.
21. Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When
Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 415 (2002).
22. John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opin-
ions, 94 LAw LIBR. J. 427, 432 (2002); Samuel A. Thumma &Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 52 (2001).
23. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 250. This article exhaustively docu-
ments every single Supreme Court use of the dictionary from the Court's inception through
1998. This includes every word or words the Court used the dictionary to define. Id. at 248-
[VOL. 38:3
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Supreme Court commentators have extensively documented the
increased use of dictionaries. Most blame Justice Scalia for this
24dramatic increase. His tenure has not only seen a large reliance
on the dictionary to support the new textualist theory of interpre-
tation, but has seen a nearly complete abandonment of another
contextual source-legislative history. 25 Legal opinions are built on
citations to prior authority such as case law. 6 When Justices turn to
grammatical interpretation of statutes, the desire to cite authority
does not dissipate. Therefore, opinions on statutory interpretation
frequently cite to legislative history, the dictionary or other seem-
ingly neutral sources as justification.27 However, Justice Scalia has
refused to join any opinion which cites legislative history.8 Follow-
ing the arrival of Justice Thomas, textualist clout doubled, forcing
Justices who need the votes of Justices Scalia and Thomas to find
sources beyond legislative history. The dictionary benefited from
this search. 9
Justice Scalia leads by example. As of the end of the 1997-98
term, he had used the dictionary more times than any justice in
history: fifty opinions, defining sixty-five terms.-s In comparison,
Justice Brennan was the previous career leader, citing the diction-
ary in thirty-one opinions.3 ' Since that time, Justices Scalia and
Thomas have continued along a steady path of dictionary use.32
B. Methods of Dictionary Use
The Court uses the dictionary for two general purposes, desig-
nated by one commentator as "verification" and "definition."3 3 The
Definition Method is simply using the dictionary for its most com-
monly assumed purpose: to define a word whose meaning one
62 nn.169-82. The authors repeat this exhaustive documentation for 1998 to 2000. Thumma
& Kirchmeier, supra note 22, at 432-34 nn.26-43.
24. See Hasko, supra note 22, at 432; Solan, supra note 19, at 50-51.
25. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 642-43.
26. For a discussion of this fairly common principle, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
27. See Solan, supra note 19, at 55-56.
28. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 365.
29. Id.
30. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 261.
31. Id.
32. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 22, at 52.
33. See Hoffman, supra note 21, at 415.
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does not know.4 The Verification Method involves using the dic-
tionary to verify the ordinary usage or meaning the Court is trying
to assign.35
1. Definition Method-The Definition Method comprises a small
percentage of the Court's dictionary use and is considered fairly
uncontroversial when used to define contemporary words with
contemporary sources.36 From 1994 to 2002, the Court used the
Definition Method in twenty-two opinions, compared to the Verifi-
31cation Method in 124 opinions. Usually the Court uses a
specialized dictionary to define technical terms.s
A subset of the Definition Method occurs when the Court tries
to define a word's usage at the time a statute was written. 39 There is
an intuitive comfort in using an old dictionary to define a word for
which the usage has changed over time. However, linguists and le-
gal commentators have pointed out problems with this reliance on
old dictionaries.40 As will be discussed below, lexicography does not
always encompass a full range of usages-sometimes accidentally.
41
2. Verification Method-Verification is the more frequent and
more criticized method of dictionary use; this Note focuses on this
method. To a layman, it may seem inexplicable why Supreme
Court Justices would need to look up such words as "any," "attor-
ney," "coal," "have," "medical," nurse," "mixture," "or," and "try."
42
But the justices use a dictionary for this purpose with increasing
frequency.
In a series of three cases,43 the Supreme Court cited five differ
ent dictionaries, a variety of works of popular fiction, newspaper
articles, and even the Bible to support their varying views of the
definition of "to use" and "to carry" in relation to a sentencing
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 415. These include multiple opinions for single cases. The number came
from adding up Hoffman's original counts for individual Justices.
38. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500-01 (2002) (defining
"cost" in a specialized accounting sense with economic and accounting dictionaries).
39. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 416. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 475 (2002) (defin-
ing "enumeration" with reference to dictionaries in use during the late eighteenth century).
40. See Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2177-80 (arguing that old dictionary definitions do
not necessarily encompass actual usage and, therefore, do not support the textualistjustifi-
cation for using dictionaries in the first place).
41. See infra Part IIA.2. See also Hoffman, supra note 21, at 406-07; Sonpal, supra note
12, at 2211-15; Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARiz. ST. L.J. 275 (1998).
42. Hasko, supra note 22, at 429-37.
43. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.
137 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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enhancement for a drug related offense. The statute in question
reads, in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a
firearm" is subject to additional penalties." This seemingly straight-
forward sentencing enhancement yielded a myriad of challenges
due to the many creative ways criminals "use" and "carry" firearms
during drug deals.
The first case to challenge the ambiguity of the "use" provision
was Smith v. United States." John Angus Smith attempted to trade a
MAC-10 automatic weapon for three grams of cocaine. Unfortu-
nately for Smith, the purchaser was an undercover narcotics
officer. The problem presented to the Court was whether Smith's
"use" of the firearm during the transaction fit with the statute's in-
tentions. The majority argued that while at first glance one might
define "to use" as "to use as a weapon," that did not "preclude us
from recognizing that there are other 'uses' that qualify as well."0
6
The Court used Webster's New International Dictionary to verify a
definition of "to use" as "to convert to one's service" or "to em-
ploy."07 The interpretative question then became whether "active
employment" encompassed trading a gun for drugs.48 The majority
concluded that it is reasonable to interpret "to use"-under the
chosen definition-to include bartering.49 In short, the majority
used the dictionary to verify their linguistic intuitions that "to use"
could have the usage they were trying to attach to it.
C. Defense of the Practice
Of course, dictionary use has some logically defensible basis in
a new textualist statutory analysis. First, new textualists make
convincing arguments in their rejection of legislative history as an
accurate and judicially restraining method of interpretation.
Among the various criticisms, new textualists have argued that
legislative history purports to show a collective intent of the
legislature when nothing that simple could possibly exist among
44. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1986), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
45. Smith, 508 U.S. 223.
46. Id. at 230.
47. Id. at 229.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 236-37.
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535 opinionated men and women."0 Justice Scalia notes that the
unfortunate by-product of judicial reliance on legislative history is
that it becomes increasingly less. trustworthy as a source of actual
intentions the more it is used since legislators will use the record to
insert "intentions" that were not meant to be in the statute.'
Lacking legislative documentation besides the statute, resorting
to the dictionary seems like a reasonable step in construing am-
biguous words within a statute. One reason textualists have not
presented a fully articulated defense of dictionaries might be that it
is assumed none is necessary since dictionaries are universally ac-
cepted as objective.52 However, serious criticisms of dictionary use
call this assumption into question.
II. CRITICISMS OF DICTIONARY USE
In an oft-quoted passage, Judge Learned Hand, arguing for
imaginative reconstruction of intentions, said: "[I]t is one of the
surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympa-
thetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their
meaning.""5 Essentially, without going through the linguistic
machinations found below, Judge Hand recognized that dictionar-
ies give one little insight without the contextual reference of a
statute's purpose.
Criticisms of dictionary use have fallen into two basic categories.
The first is that judges have devised no consistent method for
evaluating which dictionaries are appropriate choices for various
situations. The second line of criticism is more fundamental to the
nature of dictionaries. Dictionaries define words acontextually and
are not appropriate guides to the actual usage of words within
phrases and sentences. This second line has broken down into two
subcategories: 1) criticisms of the Definition Method for old stat-
utes with old dictionaries; and 2) criticisms of the Verification
Method with contemporary dictionaries.
50. SeeJohn F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673,
675 (1997).
51. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 34.
52. See Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2197.




Besides listing every word ever defined by the Court, Samuel
Thumma and Jeffrey Kirchmeier calculated that approximately 120
different dictionaries were cited through the 1997-98 term of the
Supreme Court.54 Among general usage dictionaries, Webster's Third
International Dictionary led the pack, appearing in 102 opinions,
with Webster's Second International appearing in eighty-eight, and the
venerable Oxford English Dictionary in forty-six.55 Despite the huge
number of dictionaries from which to choose, and their usually
dispositive impact on a case, judges offer little explanation or
methodology for their choices.1
6
1. Specialized vs. General--Before choosing the dictionary edition,
the Court must first decide if a general dictionary or a specialized
(usually law) dictionary is more appropriate.57 For specialized dic-
tionaries, the most frequently used have been various editions of
Black's Law Dictionary (107 times) and Bouvier's Law Dictionary (thirty-
six times) . 8Justices rarely use other law dictionaries.59
It is generally a judgment call whether a certain word or phrase
was used as a legal term of art or in a general use context. While
different rules exist for contract interpretation,'o judges must rely
on their intuitions, which occasionally differ, for statutory interpre-
tation. This represents more than mere procedural preference as
the decision between specialized and ordinary can be dispositive in
a decision. 6' For example, in Sullivan v. Stroop the Court looked at
an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) provision
that allowed the Department of Health and Human Services to ig-
nore the first fifty dollars a family received each month in "child
support" when calculating benefits.6 2 Plaintiffs argued that "child
support" should be defined as all payments supporting children,
54. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 262.
55. Id. at 262-63.
56. Id. at 272. See also Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 22, at 53-54 (listing recent
cases in which the Court used various dictionaries to come to disparate conclusions).
57. See Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2198.
58. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 263.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of
Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (noting the term "prevailing party" was a legal term of art).
62. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990).
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including their Social Security payments. 63 The majority cited
Black's Law Dictionary and other statutory provisions to determine
that "child support" was a legal term of art limited to court-ordered
payments. However, Justice Stevens' dissent argued that "child
support" was clearly an ordinary meaning term, unlimited by legal
definitions."
The problem is not that judges must choose between the two-
this is a role (and skill) textualists or intentionalists would agree a
judge is capable of fulfilling. The issue in the first level of diction-
ary choice is demonstrated in Sullivan, where the majority merely
stated that "child support" is a term of art and then worked logi-
cally from that point.66 The dissent, on the other hand, said Social
Security clearly "supports a child" and worked logically from that
point.6' Neither side felt the need to justify the original dichotomy,
resulting in a lack of consistency. As discussed in Part III, this de-
ductive logic amounts to a formalist sham, with later arguments
merely acting as a smoke screen, diverting attention from the un-
justified rule originally deduced.
2. Types of General Dictionaries-Without delving too deeply into
the history of lexicography, there has long been a split between
the descriptive and prescriptive methods of dictionary writing.69
The earliest dictionaries were written by elites who wished to con-
vey the correct usage of phrases and terms. Most notably, Dr.
Samuel Johnson wrote one of the first English dictionaries with the
goal of "fixing" certain problems in the language.7 As such, many
lexicographers believed that prescriptive dictionaries failed to re-
flect many of the "plain meanings" of words used, and instead
reflected the authors' elite, hyper-educated view of the way words
should be used. In fact, to many of these lexicographers, "actual
usage [was] evidence of the deterioration of the language."7' This
63. Id. at 482.
64. Id. at 482-83.
65. Id. at 496.
66. Id. at 483.
67. Id. at 496.
68. See Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2180-91. Sonpal gives a detailed history of dictionaries
from the first known English Dictionary written by Samuel Johnson up to today's Webster's
Third New English Dictionary. See generally SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND
CRAFr OF LEXICOGRAPHY (1984).
69. Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2187-88.
70. See LANDAU, supra note 68, at 51. Samuel Johnson originally wrote The Plan For a
Dictionary of the English Language, which included even broader goals of correcting the way
language was spoken. Later he accepted the realities and importance of considering actual
usage while still abhorring the deterioration of language. Id.
71. Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2183. See also LANDAU, supra note 68.
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type of linguistic elitism calls into question the trustworthiness of
such dictionaries as true reflections of ordinary usage.
Additionally, the distinguished lexicographer Sidney Landau
writes that "prescription is impossible to distinguish from bias."
72
When a lexicographer attempts to write a prescriptive dictionary, it
is impossible for the politics and biases of the writer not to creep in
as decisions on usage are made according to the education and
background of the writer.7 ' Linguist and lawyer Laurence Solan says
of such lexicographical biases, "[w]e commonly ignore the fact
that someone sat there and wrote the dictionary which is on our
desk, and we speak as though there were only one dictionary,
whose lexicographer got all the definitions 'right' in some sense
that defies analysis."04 Of course, unlike legislative history, no one
can accuse the lexicographer of inserting bias to effect possible
future statutory interpretation. But the lexicographer's bias can
destroy the idea that a dictionary provides an ordinary usage. To
idealize these prescriptive dictionary definitions is the first step in a
faulty, formalist method of defining ambiguous terms.
In the late 1800's a movement grew in England for the lexicog-
rapher to act more as a historian than a critic. 75 The theory called
upon the lexicographer to record all the ways in which words were
used instead of merely the ways in which he wanted them to be
used.76 This theory eventually manifested itself in the Oxford English
Dictionary and later the Webster's New English Dictionary, Third Edi-
tion.77 Some hailed these dictionaries as a step forward in
lexicography, while others-including Justice Scalia-derided such
dictionaries for "casting the mantle of its approval over ... cor-
rupted English."78 Despite Justice Scalia's criticism, the descriptive
dictionary seems a better choice in finding ordinary usage, but de-
scriptive dictionaries have problems as well.
Landau describes the process of writing a dictionary as one of
unacknowledged plagiarism. While in the past it was accepted that
dictionaries would copy from each other full entries and even
72. LANDAU, supra note 69, at 32.
73. Id.
74. Solan, supra note 19, at 50. Landau says of this tendency, "Although some readers
may take all dictionary data as if they were authoritative guides on how to spell, pronounce,
or interpret meaning, they are not... so intended." Landau, supra note 68, at 217.
75. Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2186-87.
76. Id. at 2187.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2188 (quoting The Death of Meaning, THE TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 8,
1961)).
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pages, it is now thought that dictionaries should be "new."79 Landau
acknowledges that someone who attempted to write a new diction-
ary would inevitably write a dictionary filled with holes, mistakes,
and overlooked meanings. 8° Moreover, this process of copying re-
sults in slow-moving progress as dictionaries are written and re-
written. It takes years before dictionaries catch up with actual usage
of a word.8' Turning to a dictionary written contemporaneously to a
statute may not reveal the ordinary usage of the day and age, either
because of the lexicographer's preferences or the mere inability of
the dictionary to adapt.
Since the textualist approach tries to discern the plain meaning
of the statute, it follows that reliance on a prescriptive instead of a
descriptive dictionary will not achieve that goal. Nor will reliance
on an older contemporaneous dictionary. Justices rarely defend
their choice of general dictionary,82 and even more rarely discuss
the lexicographic method's consistency with their interpretive rea-
soning.3
For instance, in MCI Telecommunications v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,8 4 the Court evaluated the breadth of the word "mod-
ify." Under the statute in question, communication common
carriers were required to file tariffs with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) . The FCC was authorized to "modify any
requirement made by or under ... this section ... ,86 The FCC,
under their power to modify, made tariff filing optional instead of
required. The Court evaluated whether "modify" had a broad
enough definition to encompass so drastic a change.
The majority stated broadly that the definition does not reach
that far, writing: "Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that
'to modify' means to change moderately or in minor fashion."87
The petitioner argued that the Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary defined "modify" as "to make a basic or important change
79. LANDAU, supra note 69, at 170-73, 228.
80. Id. at 173.
81. Aprill, supra note 41, at 288 (tracing the failure of dictionaries to come near cap-
turing today's definition of computer).
82. Id. Aprill describes the ways in whichJudges choose dictionaries to find definitions
best suited for the interpretative choices they were already making-in other words, as con-
clusive justification instead of interpretive starting points. Id. at 281, 327-28.
83. See, e.g., id. at 329.
84. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
86. Id. at § 203(b)(2).
87. 512 U.S. at 225.
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in."' Accordingly, the statute was vague and therefore Chevron def-
erence89 should have been invoked.
But the Court rejected Webster's Third in saying that all dictionar-
ies published at the time of the statute held the more narrow
definition. A legislator might have been using "modify" with a
meaning that had not yet reached the slow-moving dictionary. In-
deed, Sidney Landau might argue it is the natural result that the
dictionaries all have similar definitions, both old and new. He
might argue that it is the logical result that the old and new dic-
tionaries have similar definitions-dictionaries are constructed by
copying predecessors, so they share a common lineage. 90 In other
words, dictionaries written at the time of the statute might never
have attempted to capture the ordinary usage because they were
borrowing from prior dictionaries.
The Court goes on to explain in a far shorter section that the
tariff filing portion of the statute was "the heart of the common-
carrier section of the Communications Act."91 In other words, by
basically eliminating the provision, the FCC made a far broader
change than the "modify" provision contemplated.
The dissent argued that even if they accepted the majority's
definition of "to modify," they could not agree that the de-tarrifing
policy was any sort of major or "cataclysmic" policy shift.92 The
point of this Note is not to decide if de-tarrifing is a major or mi-
nor shift. That is exactly what the Court should be deciding. The
Court should not be arguing, however, which dictionary definition
of "modify" is more appropriate. As will be explained further, lin-
guistic intuitions are quite clear that "to modify" exists as a
marginal categorization within "to change." To attempt to place an
exact meaning is futile and fallacious. Any answer will be self-
serving by definition because, as Landau points out, it will involve
biased decision-making as the court becomes a lexicographer.
Indeed, one could imagine future additions of Black's Law Dic-
tionary or the Oxford English Dictionary reflecting the Court's
lexicographical work, making the Court's use of a dictionary an
88. Id. at 225-26.
89. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 387 (1984) (holding
that deference should be given to agency interpretations that a statute can reasonably bear);
see also Merrill, supra note 9, at 353-54 (arguing that textualism allows the Court to be an
'anonymous interpreter" thereby rendering Chevron deference inapplicable).
90. Landau, supra note 68, at 228 ("All commercial dictionaries are based to some ex-
tent on preexisting works.").
91. 512 U.S. at 229.
92. Id at 241 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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almost circular logic devoid of the judicial restraint so vaunted by
the new textualists.
B. Dictionaries as a Violation of the Non-Delegation Doctrine
Textualists argue that by giving weight to legislative history,
there is an inherent approval of lawmaking which never passed
through the constitutional process of bicameralism and present-
ment.93 Textualists accept particular forms of extrinsic contextual
information beyond the "four corners" of a statute, such as seces-
sion to the interpretations and delegations of power to executive
agencies; judicial decisions; legal treatises; and dictionaries.94 How-
ever, power has been officially delegated either by the Constitution
or by the legislature to both the precedence of judicial opinions
and the interpretations of executive agencies. Excluding legal trea-
tises for the purpose of this Note, dictionaries are a glaring piece of
extrinsic evidence that has neither passed through bicameralism
and presentment nor been delegated by a legislative authority.
Manning explains that "textualists often rely on extrinsic
sources, such as judicial decisions and legal treatises ... that have
not undergone the legitimating process of bicameralism and pre-
sentment."5 A textualist might argue that the use of legislative
history is more egregious than the use of other extrinsic sources
because it puts in the hands of Congress both the ability to write
the statute and to interpret it.96
Solan points out that dictionaries are merely written by a person
making judgments and decisions.97 They are not infallible or con-
stitutionally empowered sources. Recall that the Smith Court
replaced the phrase "to use" with the definition "to actively em-
ploy."98 Congress, of course, did not say "to actively employ."
Congress said "to use." Yet the Court evaluates the statute within
the framework of the second phrase. As will be shown below, the
second phrase, unlike "to use," does not have a specialized mean-
ing when combined with the word "firearm."' This allowed the
Court, through extrinsic evidence, to redefine the statute in an in-
93. See Manning, supra note 50, at 675.
94. Id. at 695-97.
95. Id. at 695.
96. Id. at 675.
97. Solan, supra note 19, at 50.
98. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993).
99. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 465.
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tuitively dissatisfying manner. The Court was more comfortable
with the definition written by some other person then they were
with the legislators who were democratically elected to write the
statute. It is logically inconsistent to use as dispositive one piece of
non-delegated contextual evidence and to ignore another on the
same grounds. As will be shown below, neither piece of extrinsic
evidence was necessary.100
C. Dictionaries are Acontextual
In a harsh dissent in Smith, Justice Scalia argued that "the Court
does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can
be used and how it ordinarily is used."'0 1 Scalia's dissent in Smith
makes a strong point that words cannot be defined independently
of their context. Scalia wields the same New Webster's International
Dictionary, but instead of using it as a conclusory definition, he uses
the example phrases to show that reasonable interpretations can
vary widely.02 Through analogy, Scalia points out the many applica-
tions of the word "use" but notes that each relies on the context of
the application. For instance, if one asks, "do you use a cane?" the
natural implication is that the cane is being used to assist in walk-
ing, not as a wall decoration. 0 3 Scalia notes that the statute does
not refer to using a gun to scratch one's head, but rather as a
weapon to either intimidate or to shoot.
0 4
It is obvious that had Smith given money for cocaine instead of a
MAC-10, one could say "Smith used money to buy cocaine." How-
ever, applying this expansive meaning of "to use" in "use a firearm"
feels intuitively incorrect. The natural intuition is that the phrase
"use a firearm" is meant to encompass more than the mere presence
100. Legal treatises seem equally problematic in this respect. Cf Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2101 (2002) (dis-
cussing constitutionality of invoking pre-enactment legislative history and post-enactment
legislative history to resolve ambiguities in a statute).
101. 508 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). See Note, Looking It Up, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (1994).
The author contends that dictionaries, instead of being a starting point for interpretation of
definitions, are too often used as a conclusory point. Id. at 1452.
103. Smith, 508 U.S. at 243.
104. Id. In answer to this, the majority charged that Scalia's interpretation would apply
to someone who shot the gun, but not to someone who used it to bludgeon as that is not the
normal use. Notwithstanding the "carry" section, this criticism fails to take into account that
someone using a gun to bludgeon could still be using the gun "as a weapon." Smith, 508 U.S.
at 232.
SPRIN G 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
of a firearm. Some of the criticisms of Dictionary Method as well as
a short discussion of analogical reasoning may help to explain
these intuitions.
D. Linguistic Criticisms
1. Context-The Fuzziness of Categorization-In Chapman v.
United States,'05 the Supreme Court dealt with one of many in-
stances"°6 where the mandatory minimum sentence for the
distribution of LSD diverged from the Court's sense of fair sentenc-
ing due to confusion between the statute's guidelines and the
method by which LSD is actually distributed. The statute assigned a
minimum sentence of five years for the distribution of more than
one gram of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)."' °7 Richard Chapman
sold LSD absorbed onto blotter paper, with a total weight of 5.7
grams.0 8 LSD obviously weighs far less than blotter paper, and the
question was whether Congress really meant to hinge the punish-
ment on the weight of the conveyance rather than the amount of
drugs. Stretching this interpretation to absurdity is relatively easy:
Judge Posner analogized the definition of "mixture" to punishing a
marijuana smoker based on the weight of his pipe.'"
Laurence Solan used Chapman to show that definitions are
merely attempts at usage categorization."0 A definition must be
broad enough to capture all possible meanings, yet narrow enough
to retain utility. The margins of these categories are then, by na-
ture, "fuzzy.""'
The classic linguistic example is that if one were asked "Is chess
a game?" the answer would unquestionably be "yes." 12 But, defin-
ing "game" is not so easily done. One might say, "an activity with a
board where pieces can be moved according to rules, with a goal of
winning." But this is too narrow. One might say a "competition
among two or more people." But this is too broad. Dictionaries can
105. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
106. See United States v. Larsen, 904 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Healy,
729 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Marshall, 706 F. Supp. 650 (C.D. Ill. 1989).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (2000).
108. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 456.
109. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1332 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing).
110. Solan, supra note 19, at 50.




only attempt to find the margins of the categories. Intuitions as to
what must fit inside a category become fuzzier at the margins of
that category.
13
In writing dictionaries, lexicographers do no more than deter-
mine the borders of a word as a category based on the word's usage
in the past." 4 Since the Court's verification uses are frequently
done at the margins-such as "mixture" or "use"-the dictionary as
an organic tool sheds little light.
2. Context-Specialized Meanings-Craig Hoffman explains that
words have specialized meaning based on context-verbs are de-
fined by the nouns they modify'."5 For instance, one might say,
'John uses and carries a gun, Mary a box." While "uses and carries"
has a special contextual meaning with gun, there is none with box.
Instinctually, we understand John's use is such that the gun is a
weapon, Mary's use of her box is ambiguous because "box" and
"use" have no specialized meaning."6
Hoffman concludes with an analysis even more limiting than
Scalia's in saying that not only is "use as a weapon" the ordinary or
likely meaning, it is the only meaning one can draw because of the
contextual nature of the phrase "use a firearm" and the necessary
association of the specialized meaning."7 Hoffman urges judges to
shy from dictionaries because they blunt the intuitions about the
proper usage of a word within a phrase."8 The method suggested
below borrows very much from Hoffman's idea of linguistic intui-
tions. But Hoffman's idea of intuitions and "sentence parsing"
leaves too much up to semantics and would allow clever judges to
mask biases. This Note's method suggests a form fitting within the
113. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-71 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2d ed. 1958).
114. Solan, supra note 19, at 53.
115. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 431-36 (explaining the various constraints of "physical
reduction"). See also Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A
Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of "Use a Firearm," 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1176
(1995). Hoffman's article is, in essence, a linguistic exercise in demonstrating that sentences
can only be read in certain ways because sentence structure dictates to a large extent which
words control as dominant and subservient to understanding. It is not necessary to under-
stand the particulars of the sentence diagrams to understand that all linguistic rules (not
pragmatics, but linguistic philosophy) are based on an attempt to describe intuition rather
than to prescribe how people should write or talk. Cunningham and Fillmore go through
virtually the same linguistic overtures as Hoffman and come to a similar conclusion that
linguistics should discern ordinary meaning. Id. at 1203. See generally, ROBERT LORD, WORDS:
A HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 64 (1996).
116. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 433.
117. Id.at435.
118. Id. at 437.
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classic boundaries of legal reasoning rather than linguistics to ex-
press such intuitions and force judicial "intuitions" to include
purposive arguments to encourage transparency.
III. A NEW METHOD--LINGUISTICS AND ANALOGY
Laurence Solan notes that jurists like Benjamin Cardozo have
long yearned for a code of laws "at once so flexible and so minute,
as to supply in advance for every conceivable situation the just and
fitting rule."" 9 Solan explains that while this may not exist in law, it
does in our understanding of language. "That 'code' is what lin-
guists call a generative grammar, the set of internalized rules and
principles that permit us, unselfconsciously, to speak and under-
stand language with ease and with great rapidity.' 120 This "code" is
based in our intuitions about language-Hoffman's specialized
definitions, for instance. These intuitions are not helped but actu-
ally blunted by the use of the dictionary.
12 1
A. Linguistic Philosophy
The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein gives an example of how
learning takes place over time: You are teaching a worker who
knows nothing to understand what a slab is, and how to bring it to
you. By pointing at the five slabs and saying "five slabs" you could
be either explaining that what you are pointing at is five slabs or
commanding him to bring you the five slabs. The know-nothing
may not understand which is which, but by using our intuitive un-
derstanding of language and context we could easily discern your
119. LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OFJUDGES 13 (1993) (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1921)). See also Fiss, supra note 14, at 745. Interest-
ingly, Fiss draws the same analogy between the rules of language and the rules of law. But
while Solan finds them different, Fiss sees the rules of law as equally flexible. Objectivity
exists in the process of interpretation. This sort of 'process theory' objectivity, in law and
language, does not mean there is one right answer, but one right way to go about getting an
answer that the community evaluating the interpretation will find sufficiently satisfying. The
analogical method proposed herein encompasses both Fiss's acceptable process and Solan's
intuition concerns.
120. Fiss, supra note 14, at 745.
121. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 437.
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intended meaning. 2 Wittgenstein's point is both the necessity of
the context and the idea that without context and experience,
words have no intrinsic meaning. The worker who knows nothing
has no triggered, subconscious understanding without first learn-
ing one over time.'
It is fallacious for a judge to pretend as if they are unaware of
the meaning and usage of words such as "use" and "modify" before
looking those words up in the dictionary.2 4 This is because these
words have been learned over the course of inheriting language
and contain no necessity to define exactly. The definition cannot
possibly include everything that the word might or might not con-
note.
In determining the correct interpretation of the phrase "five
slabs," no dictionary is necessary to discern the answer. In fact, no
dictionary can answer the question. It is the job of the judge to say
"five slabs" was in answer to the question of "how many slabs?" and
therefore means five slabs exist.'
B. "Reading"-A Wittgenstein-esque Word Game
Below is a word game to demonstrate by analogy the various
items in the "contextual toolbox" and the effectiveness of each,
ending with an explication of a more limiting method by shrinking
the contextual toolbox.
As children, many Jews learn to read Hebrew while in religious
school in preparation for a Bar Mitzvah-coming of age-
ceremony. This reading of the Hebrew language usually includes
no understanding of the words being read, it is merely an ability to
understand the symbols and translate them into pronounceable
words.2 6 Now, imagine a law professor gave the assignment: "Read
122. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 113, at § 21; see also SOLAN, supra note 119, at 26
("[O]ur knowledge of language, in the Chomskian sense, is contingent only on our biology
and on our having had adequate experience in childhood to acquire the language.").
123. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 113, at §§ 22-34 (describing the process of learning).
124. See LoRD, supra note 115, at 134 ("Anyone claiming not to know the use of the
words red and pain cannot be said to have mastered English.").
125. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 429. Hoffman offers a linguistic method whereby a
judge should "parse" the sentence to determine the meaning of an ambiguous word within
the context of a phrase. This Note, however, recommends a methodology whereby the judge
would determine the context of the statute before directly applying any phrasal interpreta-
tion.
126. SeeWITrGENSTEIN, supra note 113, at § 157. Wittgenstein uses the reading example to
illustrate the process of how we learn to translate those symbols into words with understood
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Scalia's dissent in Smith tonight." Would we say the student fulfilled
the assignment if their reading consisted merely of reading and
pronouncing each set of symbols without understanding the
words? Of course not. Using our various interpretive methods
though, one could come to a conclusion where the student has ful-
filled the assignment simply by reciting without understanding.
However, using a method that encompasses context, one would be
restrained to an interpretation of reading and understanding.
For instance, the first definition of read is "to examine and grasp
the meaning of."128 The second definition is "to utter or render
aloud." 9 Clearly, both are common usages of "to read." This
markedly demonstrates that it is useless to define "to read" out of
the context of the phrase in question. Were we to choose a defini-
tion here, it would only be based on the biases of the interpreter-
the frustrated teacher will choose the first, the lazy student the sec-
ond. This leaves one no closer to a constraining interpretive
method.
Perhaps the professor mumbled something afterwards about
how students never understand Scalia. This would be akin to legis-
lative history. She might be referring to her expectations of what
she meant in the assignment or she might be speaking in general,
and not referring specifically to the assignment. It might be impos-
sible to tell from merely hearing the aside. Besides, it would be fair
for the student to say that the assignment must stand on its own.
He can only be expected to understand what he was given, no
more. It would be unfair to say that her intentions in her mumble
were part of the assignment.
One could look at the context of the words together to try de-
termining which meaning fits best in the context of the entire
sentence. This might be a more intuitively limiting method than a
mere dictionary definition. "Read Scalia's dissent in Smith tonight"
would most likely mean that reading and understanding was ex-
pected. It seems that it would be useless or absurd for it to be read
any other way. But, this would not prove absolutely-only likely-
that the assignment was more than to merely read.
meanings. While the analogy here is facially similar to his example, it differs significantly in
substance.
127. See Lawrence Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 235, 254 (1997). Solan uses a facially different but substantively similar
example involving two men drinking in a bar discussing their families. One asks the other,
"Are you going to have another one?" Solan points out this can mean babies or drinks; con-
text is the only way to know the correct answer and there is only one correct answer. Id.





In his seminal work, Edward Levi attempted to explain the
workings of legal thought through analogical reasoning. s° Since
that time, vast and complex theories have attempted to describe
the true machinations behind the facially simplistic form.' This
Note will briefly describe three of the more recent writings on ana-
logical reasoning. Two authors rely on philosophy to varying
degrees-Scott Brewer and Cass Sunstein-and one, Dan Hunter,
describes modem discoveries in the cognitive science of analogical
reasoning. For the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to fully
explicate the competing views. Rather it is helpful to see where the
major similarities, if applied to defining ambiguous statutory terms,
would yield more transparent decisions holding more of what
Brewer terms "rational force. "
In short, analogical reasoning is a process of predicting certain
outcomes for ambiguous situations by making comparisons to
known outcomes in known situations.1 3 The known situation is
sometimes called a "source" and the unknown is the "target.",3 4 For
example, in the word game above, analogical reasoning was used
to decide if "to read" (the target) was more like learning a foreign
scripture (Source 1) or understanding a known language (Source
2). Note that to reach the conclusion that reading meant under-
standing, a series of assumptions were made drawing relevant
similarities to previous situations (reading means understanding
because this is a law school, all law school classes expect understand-
ing, etc.) .'3 Drawing the series of relevancies is where the fight lies
as to the quality of analogical reasoning. Some argue that there is
130. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1947); Sunstein,
supra note 13, at 742. Cf Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1996) (ar-
guing that all analogical reasoning is actually deductive reasoning or moral reasoning).
131. For a sample of the most recent influential theories, see Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 925 (1996); Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY
L.J. 1197 (2001); F.M. Kamm, Response: Theory and Analogy in Law, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 405
(1997); Levi, supra note 130; Frederic Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987); Sun-
stein, supra note 13.
132. Brewer, supra note 131, at 928.
133. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 65 (1996)
(summarizing analogical reasoning in its "characteristic form"); Brewer, supra note 131, at
955 (presenting a logical breakdown of analogy).
134. KEITH J. HOLYOAK & PAUL THAGARD, MENTAL LEAPS: ANALOGY IN CREATIVE
THOUGHT 2 (1995).
135. SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 67.
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an inescapably deductivist element-meaning a rule is formed say-
ing that Quality A (law school) always means Quality X
(understanding) .136 Others argue that there is at least some form of
"discovery" or intuitive knowledge that guides one to the correct
analogy.17 Kamm says of this moment:
While we may need a theory to explain why case A is really
more like case B than case C, we may still, without deep theo-
retical justification, see that case A is more like B than C ....
This does not (or should not) necessarily lead one to reject
the conclusion.
138
This "discovery" moment is usually compared to stories of scien-
tists who come up with a theory, virtually out of thin air, and only
, 139later find the theory correct through scientific inquiry.
1. Dan Hunter and Multiple Constraint Theory-Dan Hunter at-
tempts to quantify this moment using cognitive psychology. Hunter
uses Keith Holyoak and John Thagard's theory of analogy as occur-
ring on a level of "multiple-constraints" where instead of over-
arching general principles controlling, the various levels of con-
straints lead one to the correct analogy.'40 These constraints are
essentially: surface-level (a case about a train is like a case about a
bus) ; 141 structural, which involves a higher level of theorizing (cases
involving federal interests trumping state's interests); 42 and pur-
posive, which involves the highest theorizing and the furthest
abstraction from facts (cases involving over-arching theories ofjus-
tice). Hunter's description of cognitive psychology is important for
defining words because it confirms the linguist's idea of a defini-
tion that feels right in context based on surface and purposive
levels of similarity.'4" Hunter also becomes relevant in putting forth
a new model of defining ambiguous terms as he anticipates the use
of cognitive psychology in statutory interpretation." Hunter thinks
136. Brewer, supra note 131, at 965.
137. SeeHunter, supra note 131, at 1244; Kamm, supranote 131, at413-14.
138. Kamm, supra note 131, at 414; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 65 (arguing
against analogical reasoning as a form of deduction).
139. See Brewer, supra note 131, at 954 n.94 (citing a Nobel Prize-winning scientist's
revelation about DNA production while driving on a deserted highway in California).
140. Hunter, supra note 131, at 1215.
141. Id at 1220.
142. Id. at 1221.
143. Id. at 1245 ("There exists a temporally prior process of 'discovery' where we see
that case A is similar to case B, without any analysis of whether this similarity can be used to
justify the outcome of case B.").
144. Id. at 1236.
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that analogy when applied to statutory law will not frequently work
on the surface-level or structural mapping. 14 Instead, a jurist will
be forced to look at purposive elements of statutes to decide how
to rightly define ambiguous terms to meet some over-arching the-
146
ory.
2. Scott Brewer and Analogy Warranting Rules-Brewer relies on
the theory of reflective equilibrium to craft a picture of analogy
that is a cross between deductive, top-down reasoning and analogi-
cal, case-by-case reasoning.'47 Put simply, reflective equilibrium
occurs by taking a general principle and applying it to a variety of
situations where a desired outcome conforming to a normative
worldview is already known.' One then compares the principled
outcome to the desired, normative outcome.'49 If the principle fails,
it is then tweaked to reach the desired outcome.'5 0 By allowing flu-
idity in general principle and low-level examples, the two balance
until the principle reaches the desired result.
Brewer's analogy theory, or what he calls "exemplary" reasoning,
in its simplest state develops an "analogy-warranting rule" or
"AWR" to explain the relevancy of a source analogy to a target
analogy.' Once an "AWR" is developed, it is tested through an
"analogy-warranting rationale" or "AWRa.' ' 52 As Brewer notes, this
process can devolve into the "infinite regress" paradox, but this
problem is dismissed. 53 Brewer's AWR and AWRa provide for a test-
ing and re-testing through a reflective equilibrium that provides a
rule to apply in choosing the correct source analogy.
54
3. Cass Sunstein and Low-Level Principles--Cass Sunstein relies
most closely on the revelatory moment of "discovery"' 55 and as such
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1237 (evaluating the meaning of"unlawful killing" in two abortion statutes).
147. Brewer, supra note 131, at 938-39. Cf Richard Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top
Down and From the Bottom Up, 59 U. CHI. L. R~v. 433 (1992) (proposing the idea that the two
types of reasoning never actually meet).
148. Brewer, supra note 131, at 938-39; Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning
in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1179, 1181 (1999). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE, 48-51 (1971).
149. Brewer, supra note 131, at 938-39.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 962. See also Hunter, supra note 131, at 1260 (providing a logical map for
Brewer's theory).
152. Brewer, supra note 131, at962.
153. Id. at 971. See generally I.E. MACKENZIE, INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY,
5 (Catherine Rossbach ed. 1997) ("In attempting to be completely explicit in our expression
of a rule, we embark on an infinite regress.").
154. Brewer, supra note 131, at 971.
155. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 781-83.
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is termed by Brewer a "mystic."5 6 Sunstein's model of analogy re-
jects the philosophical idea that analogy is a crude form of
reflective equilibrium. 1 7 Sunstein sees analogical reasoning as a
"truncated" reflective equilibrium where a worldview exists but the
general principle level is never reached. Only low-level principles
attach to the analogous reasoning.58 In other words, there is no
need in Sunstein's analogical reasoning to find principles that rec-
oncile disparate examples. As an example, Sunstein explains that a
lawyer may believe "that the constitution does not create a right to
welfare, that political speech cannot be regulated without a show-
ing of immediate and certain harm, or that government may
impose environmental regulations on private companies. " 15 9 How-
ever, lawyers cannot explain these beliefs beyond "incompletely
theorized" principles.' 6 This lack of over-arching theory, what he
calls "low-level principles" or "low-level abstraction" can be seen as
a criticism, but in a sense, with statutory definitions, it may be a
virtue since the ambiguity may not require consistency within the
C0,rP~U~riS161corpus junis.
6
Sunstein sees semantics in analogical reasoning as formalism,
contributing to sham decision-making.' 62 Instead, he stresses that
analogical reasoning must go beyond semantic formalism to a sub-
stantive inquiry, drawing distinctions between examples.' Only
then can the values injected in decision-making come to light.
Brewer sees semantics as only one part of the analogical process
and he includes pragmatics in that equation as well.'64 He differen-
tiates the two in that semantics may be the possible definitions of a
word, but pragmatics would tell which usage of the word is the
most common understanding.'65 While Brewer illustrates the im-
portance of pragmatics and semantics in interpretative theory,
Sunstein's point still stands-pragmatics can be a type of formal-
iM166ism.
156. Brewer, supra note 131, at 954.
157. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 743.
158. Id. at 753-54.
159. SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 68.
160. Id.
161. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 753-54.
162. Id. at 755-56.
163. 1& at 756-57.
164. Brewer, supra note 131, at 987-88.
165. See i& Brewer cites the question "can you pass the salt" to show that pragmatics are
needed to realize this is a request and not a literal inquiry into one's ability to pass the salt.
166. See id. at 995-96. Brewer acknowledges "open-textured" terms can have multiple
meanings which would require "multi-step" analogical reasoning.
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Rejecting formalism has important implications for defining
ambiguous terms through new textualism. The plain or ordinary
meaning rule relies on the idea that there is, in fact, an ordinary
meaning for a word or a phrase.167 But, countless examples prove
there are instances in which a word or phrase has multiple ordi-
nary meanings. Succumbing to formalism robs the definition
process of any "rational force" and leaves no practical restrictions
on interpretation.
D. A New Method: Analogical Reasoning with Linguistic Restraints
The dictionary is a failed mechanism to pinpoint exact parame-
ters of words when it is written to do exactly the opposite. 168
Analogy, like metaphor, serves to allow an indirect method of ex-
169pression. In that vein, ambiguous terms exist because language
sometimes fails in providing a direct way to encompass exact mean-
ing. 7° Reasoning by analogy, in a Rorty-ian sense, would allow the
filling of gaps by expressing the contemplated meaning in a rele-
vant phrasal context.
1 7 '
Sunstein, Brewer, and Hunter have significant commonalities
between their theories of analogical reasoning. All three see some
type of reasoning occurring in a mid-level phase of analogical rea-
soning that allows the interpreter to draw distinctions and
commonalities between the "target" and "source" examples with a
process of "discovery" followed by justification of some sort.
172
Whether it is Brewer's analogy-warranting rules, Hunter's pur-
posive-constraint level, or Sunstein's low-level connections, there is
a quasi-deductive decision following the "mystic" stage of analogical
reasoning. As shown in the linguistic discussion above, when placed
in context, ambiguous meanings should "feel" right in one sense or
another. By placing the linguistic intuitions within the form of anal-
ogy, the discovery process can be coupled with the justification
167. See supra Part II.A.2.
168. See supra Part II.D.
169. See HOLYOAK & THAGARD, supra note 134, at 8.
170. For a philosopher's viewpoint on metaphor's role in the limits of language, see
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 18 (1989) ("[Tlhe unpara-
phrasability of metaphor is just the unsuitability of any such familiar sentence for one's
purpose.").
171. Id.
172. See supra Part III.C.
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process to form a linguistically sound and legally justifiable solu-
tion.
This new method borrows heavily from Solan and Hoffman's
suggestions on understandings of meaning. 173 Solan suggests legis-
lative history as the answer to the context problem. However, he
fails to answer the textualist concerns with legislative history, saying
simply that textualism requires that we "ignore information that
anchors our understanding of the world."17' These are unjustifiably
strong words for an oft-maligned source. Solan also comes to the
conclusion that textualists use dictionaries and dictionaries are
manipulable, and therefore the method fails. 75 Hoffman's method
takes away the dictionary but replaces it only with intuition. 176 This
seems unacceptably manipulable and fails to insert any substantive
reasoning into the statutory analysis.
Instead, if judges combined the idea of intuitive word under-
standings and the well-understood process of legal reasoning
through analogy, there would be a system acceptable to the legal
community and more true to linguistics. Defining ambiguous
terms through analogical reasoning would be the superior method
to flesh out ajudge's extra-legal reasoning through the justification
process and therefore provide a more restrictive method of statu-
tory interpretation in the vein of the new textualism. Hard cases
will never yield one unassailably correct definition and
judges/interpreters will always use some sort of "impermissible"
criteria to decide such as personal moral and political beliefs. The
analogical method does not purport to arrive at the correct answer
but instead would serve to reveal judicial choices by explicating the
low-level and general principles used to arrive at such choices while
avoiding a "blunting" of linguistic intuitions.
The goal of the new method is two-fold: reach an intuitive, con-
textual conclusion and present such a conclusion in terms that are
substantive and revealing of a judge's biases. The over-arching
background is the search for plain meaning, with the recognition
thai plain meaning should not be found through formalistic con-
clusions. This eschewing of formalism serves to find a "better"
answer from the point of view of the linguist, and a restrictively sat-
isfying answer from the point of view of the textualist.
173. See Hoffman, supra note 21, at 412-15; Solan, supra note 127, at 27 1.
174. Solan, supra note 127, at 269.
175. See id. at 262.
176. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 437. Hoffman says the linguistic method solves the am-
biguity problem and allows the court to focus on a legal analysis. Id. This begs the question
though of what a legal analysis would involve if it is not used to solve the linguistic problem.
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Against Dictionaries
One might note that an analogical method of definition already
exists. Look in almost any dictionary and, beneath each definition,
there will be a series of what Landau calls "illustrative quota-
tions.' 77 These short phrases can be invented or excerpted from
famous works and are, "frequently essential to tell the reader how
the definition is actually used in ordinary context."178 In form and
function, these illustrative phrases are extremely similar steps in
the method this Note suggests for defining ambiguous terms. They
are simply source phrases to be compared with the target phrase
being researched. The dictionary researcher can then employ ana-
logical reasoning in deciding which usage is correct for her
purposes.
But, simply researching these illustrative phrases in a dictionary
is insufficient. Ladislav Zgusta described both the usefulness and
limitations of what he called "exemplification":
[T] hese examples indicate nothing that is not covered by the
definition and not everything that is covered by it. The series
of these examples is certainly not complete by far. But com-
pleteness is out of the reach of the lexicographer, in the
majority of such cases: how could he be expected to collect
"and elicit a complete list of items which can be characterized
as beautiful?1
79
The effect of Zgusta's comment on the analogical method is two-
fold: "exemplification" is an accepted method; the dictionary is an
insufficient place to find a proper range of examples. As Solan says,
a lexicographer is not infallible.' 0 A judge can and should be able
to produce source phrases for commonly used words. Once these
are produced, the analogical reasoning process should be a famil-
iar one.
E. An Example of Exemplary Definitions
A judge should look to the context of the statutory phrase to
determine from among multiple usages, which is most likely within
177. LANDAU, supra note 68, at 166.
178. Id.
179. LADISLAV ZGUSTA, MANUAL OF LEXICOGRAPHY 264 (Academia Publishing House of
tie Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1971).
180. Solan, supra note 19, at 50.
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the given phrase. Until this point, there should be very little inter-
pretive work-judges should not disagree if they are being true to
their linguistic intuitions. Here, analogies, or illustrative phrases,
can be formed to flesh out linguistic intuitions on which possible
usages feel correct. In SR International Business Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
World Trade Center Properties LLC,'s' Federal District Court Judge
John Martin, Jr. was asked to decide whether, for purposes of in-
surance reimbursements, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center consisted of one "occurrence" or two. Perhaps inadver-
tently, Judge Martin framed the problem in this analogical sense:
The extent of the liability of the insurance carriers may ulti-
mately depend upon the resolution of the question:
Which of the two following statements best describes what
caused the destruction of the World Trade Center on Sep-
tember 11, 2001?
1) In a single coordinated attack, terrorists flew hijacked
planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center.
2) At 8:46 A.M. on the morning of September l1th, a hi-
jacked airliner crashed into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center, and 16 minutes later a second hijacked plane
struck the South Tower. 
1
The opinion is notable for its remarkable similarity to the method
of interpretation suggested here. Judge Martin crafts two very con-
cise source analogies, both reasonable interpretations of the
ambiguity in question, The contract itself is the target analogy. In
insurance contracts such as these, "occurrence" is usually a defined
term. 8 3 But these contracts were merely "binders" prior to the fi-
nalization of contract language, hence the ambiguities. 8 4 Tragedy
struck before the contract negotiations were finished, leaving the
courts to adjudicate the meaning of the ambiguous term.1
85
Use of this example does not argue that a contract
interpretation method should be used for ambiguous statutory
181. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9966 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
182. Id. at *6. Please note that this is in the context of a contract and not a statute. Fur-
ther, the judge was deciding a motion for summary judgment, so he was not forced to
resolve, only agree that an ambiguity existed. Id.





terms. It merely shows a vivid example of possible target analogies
for an ambiguous source. Were this a statute, a few simple steps
would follow the creation of the source analogies to resolve the
ambiguity. This is the classic hard case. A judge would attempt to
distinguish plain meaning through common sense. One analogy
might feel better than another. This is the revelatory or mystic part
of the process. But in hard cases, where parties have staked out two
reasonable interpretations, this initial reaction may only be a
guiding background. The justification process should force logical
reasoning. This is the exact moment in which a dictionary provides
cover and should be eschewed.
This point is worth repeating in a different form. In choosing
between analogies, the goal is to formulate a principle that reveals
a judge's bias. In World Trade Center Properties, Judge Martin ends
the opinion by juxtaposing the sympathy for the property owners
(and the desire to rebuild quickly) with the importance of fairly
adjudicating a disputed contract term.'86 At some point, a judge
would have to decide between these competing, low-level princi-
ples. This may involve expanding to the statute as a whole to
determine the general intent, or the evil the statute might be ad-
dressing.'8 7 A judge should justify the final choice by making an
interpretive argument to find some "analogy warranting rule" to
justify what may have been pure linguistic intuition. Majorities and
dissents can disagree over the larger intent of the statute or "pur-
posive constraint" and then apply the correct contextual definition
based on their answer. These are not over-arching rules necessarily
but more akin to Sunstein's ."low-level" principles. 8  Even if this was
a statute, choosing between the developer and the insurer in the
above case reflects no overarching theory of justice, but a case-
specific principle must be enunciated. The decision must be made
on comparing low-level principles, starting with the linguistic con-
text. Any additions to such context must be out in the open to
justify the analogy. Brewer might call this the analogy-warranting
rule, Hunter might find this a "purposive" constraint. This is more
than merely "parsing the sentence"' 9 but involves the limitations of
what might analogously be considered the common law, the statute
and, of course, common sense.
186. Id.at*18.
187. Solan, supra note 127, at 271 (quoting CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)).
188. SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 67.
189. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 436.
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The textualist idea of contextual meaning has much intuitive
force, but only by explicating all extra-legal reasoning can the
process truly become restraining. Inconsistent judgments cannot
be masked in the parsing of a sentence or the semantics of a dic-
tionary choice. A judge's reading of a law's plain meaning would
have to stand naked to the world, able to withstand intuition and
reason.
Of course, one must note that definition through analogy fre-
quently occurs. 9° However, more frequently than not this
analogical reasoning is conclusive rather than investigative. As Sun-
stein says, "[s]purious classification, or bad formalism, often
masquerades as analogical reasoning."' 9' In complex questions, an
example used as a deduction, "masquerading" as analogy, should
not be confused as the methodology suggested here.'92
IV. FiSS AND THE EFFICACY OF PROCESS RESTRAINTS ONJUDGES
If we accept the analogical method, then a judge is confronted
with a lack of a citable source on which to stand his opinion. Owen
Fiss contends that an objective interpretation of a text-which is
what the analogical method would be-does not assume that there
is a right or a wrong answer for interpreting a text.93 However, it
does assume that there is a right procedure for interpreting a text
and if followed, will yield more restraining results.94 By this reason-
ing, a judge properly arguing ambiguous definition through
analogy is sufficiently restrained by the process of legal reasoning,
despite the absence of citation.
A critic of art or literature has no stand-alone authority.19 All au-
thority of the critic is derived from the power of the critic's
interpretation and its acceptance in the interpretive community.'9 6
Therefore, the legitimacy of the art critic is based solely on the
190. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 91 (2001) (analogizing a
list of tax statutes to a list of car brands as proof of a mistaken word usage); Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 245 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
191. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 756.
192. Scalia's dissent in Smith may be a good example of this. There is analogy without
reason, rendering analogy essentially formalistic. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
243 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Language itself, essentially formalistic pragmatics, is used
to justify Congress's intended meaning rather than a greater purposive element. Id.
193. SeegenerallyFiss, supra note 14.
194. Id. at 744-45. As the argument between textualism and intentionalism has shown,
the more restraining method is the more desired method. See Sonpal, supra note 12, at 2180.




acceptance of his work by his peers. However, because the com-
munity is ad hoc built around agreement on interpretation, the
community is always shifting and changing as the agreements
change. There are essentially no constraints on the interpretive
theory-a critical nihilism.' 97
Fiss believes the judge, however, is vested with an authority that
exists outside of the strength of his logic-a constitutional
grounding of an authority that disregards the "correctness" of his
interpretations.'98 The judge does not belong to an amorphous,
changing community but rather "an interpretive community ...
by virtue of a commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law
itself."'9 So, unlike the nihilist community of artistic interpreta-
tion, judges are constrained by the common goals of the
community. These standards may change, but it is not the judge's
or interpreter's role to change the constraints. Fiss sees these
constraints manifesting in internal and external perspectives. °0
Internal perspectives involve the legal community's accepted in-
terpretive method: the "process" of interpretation. 20' The external
perspectives involve the layman's acceptance of judicial rulings in
terms such as "moral," "political," and "religious."
202
The analogical method is the hallmark process by which the
judge's interpretive community operates.02 For reliance on intui-
tive constraints to be sufficiently limiting, it must follow that
judges are themselves judged within a community and the ap-
proval of that community must be necessary for a judge's
legitimacy. To achieve this approval, the analogical method relies
on the constraints of this quasi-hermeneutic circle only to the
point that it sees a necessary common understanding in the proc-
ess of applying a chosen context to a particular word or phrase.2 °
197. Id. at 746.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 747.
201. Id. See also Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 329, 354 (1995) (arguing for
politically realistic interpretive methods).
202. Fiss, supra note 14, at 749. See also Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for
Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REv. 889, 929 (1992). Rubin describes and expands
on a Gadamer-inspired theory of legal criticism. He shows that one theory can be rejected as
incorrect by an interpretive community yet accepted as a forwarding of legal theory within
the confines of the community. Simultaneously, another theory can be rejected and remain
outside the acceptance of the interpretive community. Id. at 933.
203. See generally, LEvi, supra note 130.
204. See Fiss, supra note 14, at 745 ("The bounded or relativistic quality of the interpre-
tive method is suggested by the idea of the hermeneutic circle, which denotes the
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The process of choosing between contextually placed analogies
falls within already accepted constraints of statutory interpreta-
tion.
The method includes the "discovery" moment-the idea that
an analogy intuitively feels correct before it can be justified. If
accepted within the "process" of interpretation, then its nature as
"intuitive" has no less constraining force than stare decisis or any
other written word or external source. In other words, applying
this internal source method wrongly will result in the same ille-
gitimacy as any external source interpretive method. In fact, Fiss
writes: "The idea of an objective interpretation does not require
that the interpretation be wholly determined by some source ex-
ternal to the judge, but only that it be constrained."20 5 The
constraints derive from the interpretive community which recog-
nizes the rules of interpretation as authoritative.2 0 6 Apply those
rules incorrectly, including linguistic intuitions, and legitimacy
will not be granted.
CONCLUSION
The dictionary, while tempting as a tool to discern ordinary us-
age, is actually less accurate and less constraining than one's
developed linguistic intuitions. New textualists should forego the
dictionary and eliminate it from their "contextual toolbox." In-
stead, a judge should compare a word's possible usages and trust
linguistic intuitions in the revelatory process of analogical reason-
ing. Then, the statute's intent and contextual considerations
should be used to form a justification among analogies, in place
of the dictionary. The justification should be supported by a con-
textual reading of the phrase, using the intentions of the statute
both within itself and placed alongside the corpus juris. The ar-
guments between judges should occur in this realm, because it
avoids the formalism that dictionaries allow and leads to more
openness about biases-hence more restraint on judicial lawmak-
ing. Once the contextual intent is fleshed out, developed
linguistic intuitions force limited satisfying interpretations of an
ambiguous phrase or word, rendering the dictionary superfluous.
parameters within which an interpretation achieves its validity and is based on the assump-
tion that, at some point, an interpretation must make an intuitive appeal to common
understandings."). See generally David Couzens Hoy, Hermeneutics, 47 Soc. REs. 649 (1980).
205. Fiss, supra note 14, at 744.
206. Id.
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If accepted within the legal community, this internal source
method holds equal, if not greater, constraining force than any
external source method, particularly the dictionary.

